The severity of the risks faced by countries like the UK, combined with the impossibility of agreeing precisely on their nature, demands a fairly fundamental shift in climate discourse and action. The UK, like almost all nations, is profoundly unprepared for crises coming from climate chaos and ecological breakdown and likely from elsewhere too (Step forward, AI…). Whatever their form, such crises appear increasingly likely, as even evidence from the UK security community indicates. Despite the lessons of COVID-19, a serious approach to forward-looking resilience remains absent, and perhaps nowhere more critically than in the face of catastrophic risk of climate and ecological breakdown.
For too long, discourses around systems change in response to ecological breakdown have revolved around debates that will not resolve themselves until it is too late to prepare adequately for the possibilities being discussed. We should move on to formulating and undertaking responses to outcomes that both experts and the population agree are plausible, but which are not necessarily provable. In a world of increasing uncertainty and instability, these are the outcomes that matter.
Interminable debates include the validity of forecasts based on models, scientific interpretations of complex and unclear evidence, the sustainability of our economic systems, and the impact of potential innovations such as nuclear fusion and direct air capture. Resolving these debates within society as a whole, not merely reaching agreement among experts, is not credible for many reasons. Views on the future differ dramatically because of unprovable assumptions about technological ‘wildcards’. Debates are influenced by profound ideological resistance, motivated reasoning, and the inherent indeterminacy of cutting-edge research itself, both on climate science and technology. And unlike other scientific efforts there is no way for models of global environmental catastrophe to prove their predictive validity until it is too late to do anything about those predictions.
This is what our new report is centrally about: How we proceed sensibly, pragmatically, effectively, given the unwinnability of such debates.
We use the debate around degrowth as a case study. Degrowth is gaining traction in academic and activist communities, leading some advocates to conclude that a breakthrough into the social and political mainstream is just around the corner. However we argue that, whatever one’s evaluation of the evidence, the growth/degrowth debate remains in an important sense ‘unwinnable’, for the kind of reasons outlined in the previous paragraph.
Given this, it is a profound and dangerous illusion to believe that the massive, powerful, inertial forces of the growthist ideological status quo, or even the general public, are going to be intellectually convinced that degrowth is certainly correct in time to avoid catastrophe. Though debate must continue, we should not bet the earth on a decisive victory in the degrowth debate (or many other positions like it favoured by many in the climate movement and beyond). This risks leaving us unprepared for disaster(s). Even if these positions do turn out to be correct, it will be nigh on impossible for them to form the basis for massive, consensus-driven transformations in the timeframes we are bound to.
Our ‘unwinnability thesis’ demonstrates that the most productive path forward lies not in endless contention in the hope of honing a decisive winning argument, but in pursuing a more attainable consensus around what an adaptive response to the worst case scenario looks like. This necessitates great focus on creating a “Plan B”: having a strategy of “Strategic Adaptation” (including preparedness for potential societal breakdown) that is politically and culturally attractive. Such a plan should focus on concrete measures, irrespective of differing shades of belief about climate realities, or differing political affiliations. This implies devoting greater time to concretely planning for plausible disaster scenarios, building national and local resilience and building preparedness for disruption into our lives. This approach aligns with a growing expert consensus, which warns against an over-reliance on probability, let alone certainty, in risk planning.
Our report identifies two types of resilience building action which might form part of a plan B. ‘No regret’ actions will provide benefits whichever future comes to pass, while precautionary actions focus primarily on avoiding the worst consequences of potential risks. We discuss the role of each of these, and the potential co-benefits for motivating action and alignment that come from preparedness planning.
We call for action at both community and national government levels to build resilience against catastrophic climate risks.
At the community level, residents should build local resilience through community building and mutual aid, conduct local risk audits and invest in shared supplies, infrastructure and the bases of psychological resilience. This will among other things create salience and potentially shame among those operating at the political level.
At the national level, we call on government to urgently take the following steps:
>Develop a food security strategy that accounts for tipping point risks and prepares contingency measures such as rationing.
>Audit and harden other critical supply chains against climate and geopolitical shocks, with a view to reducing strategic long-supply-line dependency/vulnerability.
>Ensure critical national infrastructure is resilient to both extreme heat and cold, including the underappreciated risks of AMOC collapse.
>Normalise preparedness across the population through public campaigns, a Citizens Adaptation Toolkit, and support for psychological as well as practical resilience.
>Finally, develop and fund a comprehensive National Resilience Plan that goes well beyond the existing ‘National Adaptation Programme’, integrating scenario planning for worst-case outcomes and cascading global risks.
The overarching message is that given deep uncertainty about the scale and nature of coming climate impacts, prudent preparedness is not optional — it is a matter of (national) survival.
Our aspiration with this report is to offer an argument that bypasses unwinnable debates to reach a common ground that the clear majority can agree upon: that such prudence is nothing more or less than common sense. That it is high time we segued into having a back-up plan for things going catastrophically wrong; that the longer we lack such an active plan the more exposed we are. That we should focus much more on agreeing on what we can – and actually need to – agree on than on what divides us. That a sense of collective purpose can come from that kind of deeply pragmatic and mutually protective agreement.
We are intellectuals who have written a report. The point of the report is: to argue in favour of intellectual humility. Let’s rely less on convincing ‘the other side’ that they are wrong; more on common ground, and a new common sense. Let’s drop Enlightenment pretensions that don’t serve us, in a time of emerging crisis that demands thinking in the service of practical action.
Let’s at every level lean into creating a plan B. We hope you’ll read and share our report, and thus help to make it so.
