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Reality Report: Jay Hanson (audio)
Jason Bradford, Reality Report via Global Public Media
In the 1990s Jay Hanson’s web site predicted with uncanny accuracy key trends of the early 21st century with respect to energy, the environment and geopolitics. What did he learn that most of us still don’t know, and what does he foresee ahead of us?
This program reviews the history and motivation behind Jay’s work. With his background in computer programming, he is able to keenly parse a great deal of information into a logical framework, combining analyses of history, politics, biology, energy and economics into a generally horrific view of the future. Jay explains how he believes that until we face the causes of the crises upon us we will not overcome them. However, understanding is seriously hindered by self-deception and political expediency.
As a contrast to the horrors of war and coercion he fears are upon us, he uses his knowledge of ecology and energy to envision a sustainable society–the difficulty he has is seeing a path to get there.
(1 November 2008)
Long discussion about Jay on The Oil Drum: Jay Hanson and Warsocialism.com.
I admire Jay’s diligence in compiling dieoff.org, and I read many of the articles there when coming up to speed on peak oil and sustainability. I have not been very enthusiastic about Jay’s writings in the last few years.
Jason’s interview with Jay Hansen is highly recommend for anyone curious about Jay. As Jason notes in his debriefing after the interview, hearing Jay’s voice is very important, since in his writing he can seem harsh.
I think it’s helpful to divide Jay’s writings into two parts.
First are the concerns with energy and resources. I agree with everything he said on this subject. His thinking is part of the “Limits to Growth” school represented by Richard Heinberg, Ted Trainer, Howard Odum, Hubbert and many others.
Second are his theories about social behavior and politics. In the interview he was much milder than in his writings. For example he didn’t mention his suggestion to
“Increase our fraction of global net energy (divert energy from competitors) directly by military action.”
The main problem here is that he is theorizing in fields in which he doesn’t have a background. The result is a disappointing mish-mash of pop-biology and pop-sociology.
If one wants to write about social behavior one should really do some reading in anthropology, sociology and political science. Other people have passed this way before.
For example, Jay’s discovery that people often act from unconscious motives might be news in 1908, but is familiar ground now. For me, the most convincing explanations come from psychologists like Freud and sociologists like Marx (the idea of “ideology”). For more on this, see Beyond the Chains of Illusion by Erich Fromm.
Sadly, Jay turns to biological determinism to explain social behavior. Confidence is not inspired by previous examples of biological determinism, such as Social Darwinism, theories of racial superiority, and William Shockley’s ideas. Inevitably biological determinism leads to reactionary politics and Jay had been sticking his toes into some pretty nasty stuff in his writings. The name of one of his sites – WarSocialism – gives an idea of what he was toying with.
The most refreshing part of the interview was when Jay admitted that he didn’t know the answers to our problems, and invited other people to pitch in.
Here’s hoping that Jay returns from the Dark Side and instead engages with the movements that he has helped to shape.
-BA
UPDATE (Nov 5, 2008)
Reader TF takes exception:
Your comments about the Jay Hanson interview are misinformed. Having followed Jay’s work over the years I can tell right away when someone hasn’t done their homework before reacting. Jay has studied evolutionary biology and the human mind extensively in an effort to understand how we will react to resource scarcity. His conclusions may seem “harsh” because all the evidence points to a massive war over resources in the near future. That’s the inevitable conclusion that one must come to after studying the human brain, our biology and our history. His prescriptions, one of which you cited, have nothing to do with his ideology (I believe Jay is the most logical and least ideological person I’ve ever met). They are simply a list of things he thinks might work or might be attempted to deal with declining resources and rising demand. Again it’s all based on his understanding of human behavior and genetic drives which cannot be altered.
I’m sorry you felt the need to comment without immersing yourself in some
of the material Jay recommends.
BA: I hope that TF and Jason Bradford are right that Jay’s proposals are not as Draconian as they seem. It is difficult to tell from his writings.
About evolutionary psychology… Yes, an interesting approach, though not without controversy. Jay seems to take more categorical positions than scientists like Melvin J. Konner. TF confirms that Jay’s ideas lean towards biological determinism: “his understanding of human behavior and genetic drives which cannot be altered.”
More to the point, Evolutionary Psychology doesn’t seem to have much to say about the practical problems facing us, such as persuasion, social change and the characteristics of sustainable societies. At most it might have some insights to add to existing social theories.
UPDATE (Nov 16)
Since writing the above notes, I’ve had a chance to talk online with Jay Hanson. I’m happy to say that I misjudged him. He has read in anthropology, sociology, political science, economics and most other disciplines. He hates Social Darwinism and says he does not believe in “biological determinism.” Jay hopes that evolutionary psychology can find a humane solution to our present crisis.
About the above quote on resource wars, Jay says: “They are neither recommendations nor predictions. They are matters of fact.”
This is not to say that I agree with Jay on everything. I’m still skeptical that evolutionary psychology will be that useful. What I think, though, is irrelevant. My role is to find and publicize good thinking.
Jay showed me a first draft of an overview of the work that he and his group are doing. It seemed reasonable, important, and clearly stated. I thought it deserved a wider audience, and Jay has agreed for it to be posted on Energy Bulletin in a few weeks.
-Bart Anderson
Why fungibility matters (Part 2)
Jeff Vail, blog
Finishing up last week’s post on the disappearance of fungibility in energy markets, let’s look at the other factors that are contributing to “fixedness” in our civilizational energy flows:
Sunk cost fixedness: In the ’90s and early part of this millenium, the United States invested in massive natural gas-driven electricity generation capacity. Now, with natural gas much more expensive, that sunk cost is forcing up the price of electricity.
… Project timeline fixedness: Additionally, the increased volatility in energy supplies is wreaking havoc with the long time-lines to plan, permit, and build our energy infrastructure. Not only does it take years to get a project off the ground, that project must operate for years to decades to be financially viable. Because we effectively lock in energy choices a decade or more in advance, the volatility of supply and demand for different types of energy, and the volatility for demand at different locations is causing serious problems.
… Geopolitical fixedness. If oil (or gas, or coal, or uranium, or rare earth metals used in photovoltaics, etc.) was equally available from anywhere, then geopolitics wouldn’t enter into the discussion of supplies. But because resources are increasingly located in geopoliticaly challenging locales, the worlds of geopolitics and energy are increasingly interrelated.
… Now, it’s important to point out that energy fungibility as it existed in the 20th Century was truly a historical anomaly. The utter dominance of the West over global trade routes and the temporary surplus of high energy-surplus, easily transported, and truly interchangeable crude oil created a “golden age” of energy fungibility. This didn’t exist in the Middle Ages, in Rome, at the height of the Caliphate, or at any other time in our historical past. In fact, the level of free energy that we enjoyed during the 20th Century was a huge historical abberation. It funded the explosive growth in population and in the “middle class.” It has come to an end. Oh, there will be plenty of energy around for quite some time to come, but phenomena such as decreasing fungibility of that energy will make our access to it–and our enjoyment of the benefits it provides–far more intermittent, far more regionally concentrated, and far less certain.
(3 November 2008)
Once Again: ‘The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons’
Ian Angus, Climate and Capitalism
The response to my recent article, “The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons,” has been very encouraging. It prompted a small flood of emails to my inbox, was reposted on many websites and blogs around the world, and has been discussed in a variety of online forums.
The majority of the comments were positive, but many readers challenged my critique of Garrett Hardin’s very influential 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” A gratifying number wrote serious and thoughtful criticisms. While they differed in specifics, these responses consistently made one or more of these three points:
- How can you say that the tragedy of the commons is a myth? Look at the ecological destruction around us. Isn’t that tragic?
- It doesn’t matter if Hardin’s account of the historical commons was wrong. He wasn’t writing history: he just used the commons as a model, or a metaphor.
- Hardin wasn’t rejecting all commons, just “unmanaged commons.” A “managed commons” would not be subject to the tragedy.
This article responds to those points. Except under the first heading, I’ve tried to avoid repeating arguments I made in the first article, so if you haven’t already done so, I encourage you read it here first.
How can you say that?
Some respondents described ecological horrors and catastrophes — vanished fisheries, poisoned rivers, greenhouse gases, and more — and then said, in various ways, “The destruction of the world we all share is a terrible tragedy. How can you call it a myth?”
This question reflects an understandable problem with terminology. When Hardin wrote “The Tragedy of the Commons,” he wasn’t using the word “tragedy” in its normal everyday sense of a sad or unfortunate event. I tried to explain this in my article:
“Hardin used the word ‘tragedy’ as Aristotle did, to refer to a dramatic outcome that is the inevitable but unplanned result of a character’s actions. He called the destruction of the commons through overuse a tragedy not because it is sad, but because it is the inevitable result of shared use of the pasture.”
So the point is not whether ecological destruction is real. Of course it is. The point is, did Hardin’s essay correctly explain why that destruction is taking place? Is there something about human nature that is inimical to shared resources? Hardin said yes, and I say that’s a myth.
But it was only a model!
During the 1970s and 1980s, Hardin’s description of the historical commons was so thoroughly debunked by historians and anthropologists that he resorted to denying that he ever meant to be historically accurate. In 1991, he claimed that his account was actually a “hypothetical model” and “whether any particular case is a materialization of that model is a historical question — and of only secondary importance.” (Hardin 1991)
Similarly, an academic who called Hardin “one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century” wrote that his description of the traditional commons was a “thought experiment,” so criticism of his historical errors is irrelevant. (Elliot 2003)
But Hardin offered no such qualification in his 1968 essay, or in the many books and articles he wrote on related subjects in the next 20 years. Quite the opposite, in fac
(3 November 2008)
Capitalist and Socialist Responses to the Ecological Crisis
Victor Wallis, Monthly Review
… the more familiar image of green capitalism is one of small grassroots enterprises offering local services, solar housing, organic food markets, etc. It is true—and promising—that as ecological awareness spreads, the space for such activities will grow. We should also acknowledge that the related exploration of alternative living arrangements may contribute in a positive way to the longer-term conversion that is required. More generally, it is certainly the case that any effective conservation measures (including steps toward renewable energy) that can be taken in the short run should be welcomed, whoever takes them. But it is important not to see in such steps any repudiation by capital of its ecologically and socially devastating core commitment to expansion, accumulation, and profit.
To remind ourselves of this core commitment is not to claim that capital ignores the environmental crisis; it is simply to account for the particular way it responds to it.
… The reality of green capitalism is that capital pays attention to green issues; this is not at all the same as having green priorities.9 Insofar as capital makes green-oriented adjustments beyond those that are either directly profit-friendly or advisable for PR purposes or protection against liability, it is because those adjustments have been imposed—or, as in the case of wind-turbines in Germany, stimulated and subsidized—by public authority.10 Such authority, even though exerted within an overall capitalist framework, reflects primarily the political strength of non- or anti-capitalist forces (environmentalist organizations, trade unions, community groups, grassroots coalitions, etc.), although these may be supported in part by certain sectors of capital such as the alternative energy and insurance industries.
… The ideological response of capital to the environmental crisis has been to reaffirm faith in the market. At the most immediate level, this entails arguing that as any kind of good becomes scarce, its price will go up and the demand for it will consequently shrink. A problem arises, however, when the goods in question are, like air, water, soil, or forests, essential to survival. But the logic is relentless: supposedly there is nothing on which a price cannot be set, and price in turn implies ownership—a good thing, in this view, since only with ownership comes a sense of responsibility (never mind what the goals of the owner might be). The field of application for this principle is unlimited. Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal thus proposed that whales “be ‘branded’ by genetic prints and tracked by satellites, providing another way to define property rights.”15
… two further requirements for a green economy, both of which go far beyond the constraints of the capitalist paradigm. One is an end to militarism and imperialism; the other is a cultural transformation that would make possible a new consensus as to the social/economic requirements for a good life.
… The situation is comparable to that surrounding any prospective revolution: until a certain critical point has been reached, the only demands that appear to have a chance of acceptance are the “moderate” ones. But what makes the situation revolutionary is the very fact that the moderate or “realistic” proposals will not provide a solution.
… In the short term, however, there is nothing automatic in the link between green and red policy-measures. Historically, the instances of friction between the two agendas have generated more attention than have the instances of their convergence. I note here some cases which give grounds for hope.
The first example emerged from the Russian Revolution. The Soviet leadership’s continuing focus on growth was partially offset, during the early years of the regime, by an extraordinary interest in creating a more advanced level of mass culture and, with it, an approach to development that, compared to its capitalist counterparts, would be more firmly anchored in an awareness of natural limits. It was in this context that Lenin signed (in 1921) a law establishing, over widely dispersed areas in the Soviet Union, “the first protected territory anywhere to be created by a government exclusively in the interests of the scientific study of nature.”39 Although these areas (zapovedniki) were subsequently dissolved (under Stalin), what is important to us in their brief history is what it suggests about the capacities and potential initiative of socialist leadership, as well as the early sensitivity of some of the Russian Marxists—long before the current crisis—to the fragility of the ecosphere.40
The second example is the Italian city of Bologna during the period of its elected Communist government of the mid-1970s. It highlights a case where power was exercised at the municipal level, within a capitalist framework. It is important, however, for what it suggests about the processes involved in any full-scale ecological conversion. At the heart of Bologna’s urban reform was the exclusion of private automobiles from most of the city’s central residential and business district. This outcome was achieved partly through a relatively cost-effective switch to free rush-hour bus-service and partly through several exhaustive rounds of neighborhood meetings to decide upon zoning.41
… The third and most impressive application of socialist ecology is that of Cuba. The initial effect on Cuba of the Soviet collapse (1991) offers a foretaste of the difficulties that will hit many other countries when their resource-base is cut off.
(November 2008 issue)
The November issue of the socialist Monthly Review devoted to ecological issues. -BA
