Economics – Feb 2

February 2, 2009

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Many more articles are available through the Energy Bulletinhomepage


The Oil Shock of the 1930s: Another Factor?

Mark J. Perry, Carpe Diem (blog)
[CHART]

The chart above shows the real monthly price of oil from January 1931 to December 1939, using monthly oil prices adjusted for inflation using monthly CPI data, both data series from Global Financial Data (paid subscription required). Between 1931 and 1934, real oil prices more than doubled from $20 to $40 (in 2008 dollars), and peaked at $42.59 by the summer of 1937. The oil shock of the early 1930s was roughly equivalent to the oil shock that resulted in a doubling of oil prices between 1979 and 1981, contributing to an 18-month recession and 10.8% unemployment.

Along with contractionary fiscal policy via tax hikes, contractionary monetary policy, and huge increases in tariffs and trade protection, perhaps it was also the “energy shock of the 1930s” that helped turned what would have been a fairly ordinary recession into the Great Depression?
Dr. Mark J. Perry is a professor of economics and finance in the School of Management at the Flint campus of the University of Michigan.
(15 November 2008)
Recommended by Jeffrey J. Brown (“westexas”).


Reading the Tea Leaves

Greg T. Jeffers, American Energy Crisis (blog)
While I expect the stock market to bottom sometime before ZERO, I do not think Americans are getting it yet – there will be no real recovery. EVER. (Well not in my lifetime and I am in my late – 40’s.)

The American economy, such as it is, is a Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Law, and Entertainment heavy shadow of what it once was. The states of New York (Finance) and California (Entertainment) are the best indicators of what will be across the nation. Municipal bankruptcies, 25 % of Americans on food assistance, up from 10% or 11% now (and then only if the system does not collapse), political crisis, and even the possibility of food shortages await Americans over the next decade. The TAXPAYERS (people who pay taxes on a NET basis) will simply be unable to meet the burden. And unlike the 1930’s, we have constructed a HUGE underclass of folks with no ability to provide for themselves, and no family farm to return to for meaningful work – hell, no family (fatherless households) at all.

But we do have a great many guns; a great many groups that see themselves as “victims” of bigotry or economic exclusion; a number of religious groups that encourage their members to believe that there is something more special about their group than others; and an establishment with substantial capacity to show just who REALLY is the boss when challenged (but not in the end).

This “establishment” is likely to be pretty grumpy. They had an astoundingly fortuitous position: Some phenomenon within our system directed the vast majority of society’s resources into the pockets of the top 1%.

The author is a Wall Street veteran, professional investor, and CEO of boutique investment firm Sleepy Hollow Capital, LLC a hedge fund operator and G.T. Jeffers & Co., LLC a SEC registered broker/dealer and FINRA member.
(30 January 2009)


A New New Deal under Obama?

John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, Monthly Review
With U.S. capitalism mired in an economic crisis of a severity that increasingly brings to mind the Great Depression of the 1930s, it should come as no surprise that there are widespread calls for “a new New Deal.”1 Already the new Obama administration has been pointing to a vast economic stimulus program of up to $850 billion over two years aimed at lifting the nation out of the deep economic slump.2

The possibility of a new New Deal is to be welcomed by all of those on the left, as promising some relief to a hard-pressed working population. Nevertheless, it raises important questions. What are the real prospects for a new New Deal in the United States today? Is this the answer to the current economic crisis? What should be the stance of the left? A full analysis of all the issues would require a large volume. We shall confine ourselves here to a few points that will help to illuminate the challenges ahead.

The New Deal was not initially an attempt to stimulate the economy and generate recovery through government spending, an idea that was scarcely present in the early 1930s. Rather it consisted of ad hoc salvage or bailout measures, principally aimed at helping business, coupled with work relief programs.

… It was only later on in the depression decade, in what historians have called the “second New Deal,” culminating in Roosevelt’s landslide 1936 election victory, that the emphasis shifted decisively from salvage operations to work relief programs, and other measures that directly benefited the working class. This was the era of the Works Progress Administration, headed by Harry Hopkins, along with other progressive programs and measures, such as unemployment insurance, Social Security, and the Wagner Act (giving the de jure right to organize). These advances were made possible by the great “revolt from below” of organized labor in the 1930s.

… But this raises further questions. As Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy asked in Monopoly Capital in 1966: “Why was such an increase [in government spending] not forthcoming during the whole depressed decade? Why did the New Deal fail to attain what the war proved to be within easy reach? The answer to these questions,” they contended, “is that, given the power structure of United States monopoly capitalism, the increase of civilian [government] spending had about reached its outer limits by 1939. The forces opposing further expansion were too strong to be overcome.”

… The reasons for this are straightforward. Beyond some minimal level, real estate interests oppose public housing; private health care interests and medical professionals oppose public health care; insurance companies oppose public insurance programs; private education interests oppose public education; and so on. The big exceptions to this are highways and prisons within civilian government spending, together with military spending.

… Examining these figures [in a chart listing the major industrial countries], it is clear that the United States has the lowest government final consumption (which includes military consumption) as a percentage of GDP, and is near the bottom in government spending and social security transfer payments as a percentage of GDP. The United States also expends a greater share of its national income on the military. U.S. government consumption expenditures, minus military consumption, came to only 11.8 percent of GDP in 2007. It is obvious then that there is ample room for the United States to expand its civilian government spending and social insurance transfers. The ceiling on such expenditures as a share of national income is rather a reflection of the power structure of U.S. society, including the relative weak organization of labor and the relative strength of big capital

… Our argument therefore is simple. Given that a political ceiling on U.S. civilian government purchases as a percentage of GDP has persisted for more than seven decades, it is unlikely that this will change without a massive, indeed social-transformative, struggle, despite a relatively progressive administration and the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Even the greatest environmental crisis in the history of civilization, threatening life throughout the planet, is unlikely to result in a sufficiently massive response by government without the U.S. system first being turned upside down. The forces holding down civilian government spending are too strong to be affected by anything but a major upsurge in society.
(February 2009)
A view from the left. If this analysis is correct, then the initial Obama program will be inadequate and will only be increased if there is an upsurge of political activity from below. The color of the political upsurge might be left, right or something we haven’t seen yet. -BA


Tags: Fossil Fuels, Oil